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Race,	class	and	Brexit:	how	did	we	get	here?
Although	the	anti-immigration	feeling	expressed	by	the	Leave	vote	was	ostensibly	directed	at	other
Europeans,	racist	hate	crime	also	surged	immediately	after	the	EU	referendum.	Brendan
McGeever	(Birkbeck,	University	of	London)	(left)	and	Satnam	Virdee	(University	of
Glasgow)	locate	the	causes	of	Brexit	in	neoliberalism,	the	decline	of	working-class	solidarity,	and
the	emergence	of	a	new	politics	of	racist	resentment.
The	neoliberal	settlement	in	Europe,	crafted	over	three	decades	by	conservative	and	social
democratic	parties	alike,	has	been	dramatically	unsettled	by	the	most	sustained	economic	depression	since	the
1930s.	It	is	the	hard	right,	first	and	foremost,	that	has	capitalised	on	these	historic	developments.	From	Sweden	to
Switzerland,	from	Belgium	to	Bulgaria,	a	tide	of	reactionary	populism	has	been	sweeping	the	European	mainland
which	demands	nothing	less	than	a	restoration	of	a	mythical	golden	age	of	sovereign	nation-states	defined	by
cultural	and	racial	homogeneity.	Britain	has	not	been	inoculated	from	the	turbulence	created	by	this	decade-long	and
still	unfinished	crisis	of	late	capitalism.	The	most	striking	manifestation	of	that	crisis	is	Brexit.
Bengali	New	Year	in	Bethnal	Green,	2011.	Photo:	Moustaque	Chowdhury	via	a	CC	BY	2.0
licence
If	confirmation	were	needed	that	the	Brexit	vote	was	intimately	bound	up	with	questions	of	race,	we	need	only	recall
the	wave	of	racist	hate	unleashed	against	migrants	as	well	as	the	long-established	black	and	brown	British	in	June
2016.	How	could	it	come	to	pass	that	the	first	formal	break	from	the	30-year	neoliberal	consensus	in	Britain	was
marbled	through	with	such	racism	and	violence?
Englishness:	empire,	decline	and	class	decomposition
We	suggest	the	relationship	between	race	and	Brexit	cannot	be	understood	without	accounting	for	the	invisible	driver
of	Englishness.	There	is	a	compelling	case	to	centre	the	English	story	in	Brexit:	87	per	cent	of	Leave	votes	were	cast
in	England.	Further,	79	per	cent	of	those	who	identify	as	“English	not	British”	voted	Leave,	as	did	66	per	cent	of	those
who	identified	as	“more	English	than	British”.	This	particular	vision	of	Englishness,	we	suggest,	is	characterized	by	a
new	politics	of	resentment	underscored	by	structural	decline	and	class	decomposition.
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Many	have	suggested	that	the	Brexit	visions	conjured	up	by	the	official	Leave	campaign	in	2016	were	stained
through	with	imperial	nostalgia.	We	agree.	However,	the	racism	that	animated	the	Brexit	voting	public	in	2016	has	its
moorings	not	just	in	the	aching	loss	of	Empire,	but	also	the	structural	decline	that	Britain	has	undergone	since	the
late	1970s	and	the	onset	of	neoliberalism.	The	politics	of	Englishness	today	asserts	itself	against	a	backdrop	of
Britain’s	comparatively	marginal	position	in	the	world	economy.	Alongside	this	are	the	defeats	endured	by	the	social
movements	of	the	1980s	and	the	accompanying	delegitimising	of	socialist	politics,	which	has	left	a	working	class
profoundly	disaggregated	by	region,	nation	and	ethnicity.	In	this	sense,	it	is	the	transformations	of	the	1980s,	rather
than	the	austerity	programmes	since	2008,	that	bear	heaviest	on	our	present	moment.
Significantly,	the	period	of	working	class	defeat	under	the	Conservatives	led	by	Thatcher	was	accompanied	by	the
loss	of	alternative	class	frames	of	resistance,	including	those	that	re-imagined	the	working	class	as	multi-ethnic.
Although	the	organisations	of	the	working	class	and	the	left	more	generally	have	a	long	history	of	imbrication	in	the
politics	of	racism	in	England,	these	organisations	have,	at	the	same	time,	provided	limited	but	nevertheless	important
cultures	of	solidarity	that	have	in	turn	played	a	key	role	in	re-imagining	black	and	brown	migrants	(and	their	British-
born	descendants)	as	part	of	the	working	class.	Under	Conservative	rule,	the	politics	of	class	and	the	language	of
solidarity	that	had	underpinned	working	class	politics	were	significantly	weakened.	The	historic	settlement	of	post-
1945	Britain	that	labour,	to	a	limited	degree,	was	to	be	protected	from	capital	was	reversed.	These	defeats	in	turn
profoundly	diminished	those	counter-currents	of	anti-racist	class	politics,	including	those	aligned	to	the	politics	of
blackness.
In	recent	years,	the	prospect	(and	reality)	of	downward	mobility	has	produced	class	injuries	and	collective
experiences	that	have	been	recast	through	the	politics	of	ressentiment.	Whereas	thirty-five	years	ago	labour	and
anti-racist	movements	could	meaningfully	intervene,	today	the	realignment	of	British	politics	has	(in	England,	at	least)
left	the	terrain	wide-open	to	the	right,	from	the	neoliberal	mainstream	to	its	far-right	outriders.	In	this	context,	decline,
though	necessarily	a	multi-ethnic	process,	is	experienced	in	a	racialised	frame	and	is	increasingly	responded	to	by
some	sections	of	the	working	class	through	the	politics	of	resentful	English	nationalism.	The	realignment	of	politics	to
the	right	has	therefore	created	an	environment	in	which	racism	can	be	more	readily	articulated	since	it	resonates	with
the	cultural	and	political	logic	of	our	time.
This	racialising	nationalism	has	borne	a	particularly	defensive	character	since	the	2008	crisis.
It	is	defined	not	by	imperial	prowess	or	superiority,	but	by	a	deep	sense	of	loss	of	prestige;	a	retreat	from	the
damaging	impact	of	a	globalised	world	that	is	no	longer	recognisable,	no	longer	“British”.	The	decline	of	empire,	then,
has	not	led	to	the	overcoming	of	the	English	imperial	complex,	but	its	retraction	into	a	defensive	exclusionary
imaginary:	we	are	under	siege,	it	is	time	to	pull	up	the	drawbridge.	This	was	one	of	the	defining	features	in	the
discursive	architecture	of	the	Leave	campaign.	As	Stuart	Hall	once	put	it,	“Englishness	has	always	carried	a	racial
signature”.	We	are	hearing	its	familiar	refrains	in	these	crisis-ridden	post-Brexit	times.
As	large-scale	survey	data	shows,	the	main	drivers	of	political	Englishness	are	Euroscepticism	and	concern	about
“immigration”.	Indeed,	it	is	the	racialised	question	of	“immigration”	that	is	arguably	now	defining	the	conversation
around	Englishness.	In	the	1980s	and	1990s,	public	concern	about	“immigration”	remained	relatively	low,	with	no
more	than	10	per	cent	of	the	population	seeing	it	as	a	key	issue	during	this	period.	Since	2000,	however,	the
hardening	of	attitudes	has	seen	that	figure	rise	dramatically	to	30–40	per	cent,	such	that	by	2006	“race	and
immigration”	were	recorded	as	the	most	important	issues	facing	the	country.	The	toxicity	of	the	2016	EU	referendum
has	deepened	these	trends,	and	brought	us	to	what	we	would	now	define	as	a	state	of	emergency.	The	interlocking
features	of	racialised	nationalism,	anti-immigrant	sentiment	and	Euroscepticism	–	identifiable	across	the	whole	of
Europe	–	have	come	into	full	view	in	Brexit	Britain,	particularly	in	England.	Racism	has	become	normalised	in	both
elite	political	discourse	and	practice	and	everyday	life,	dramatically	diminishing	the	spaces	for	Britain’s	racialised
minorities	to	breathe	and	live	life	free	from	hate.
The	emergence	of	the	‘white	working	class’
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Yet	while	Brexit	added	an	accelerant	on	those	conditions	and	allowed	racism	to	flourish,	it	did	not	create	them.
Across	the	political	spectrum,	from	New	Labour	to	Conservative,	a	powerful	narrative	has	become	dominant	over	the
last	decade	in	which	the	principal	losers	of	globalisation	are	referred	to	as	the	“white	working	class”.	And	this
message	has	been	amplified	over	and	over	again	by	the	right-wing	press	who	deploy	this	category	for	their	own
instrumental	ends,	particularly	for	eroding	support	for	multiculturalism.	As	a	result,	the	white	working	class	–	a
descriptive	and	analytic	category	whose	origins	lay	in	social	science	research	–	has	over	the	course	of	this	decade-
long	crisis	been	brought	to	life	ass	a	collective	social	force,	such	that	some	working	class	men	and	women	now
understand	and	make	sense	of	the	real	economic	pain	they	suffer	through	such	a	racialised	frame	of	white	working
class	victimhood.
This	construction	of	the	white	working	class	has	led	to	a	number	of	deleterious	developments	in	the	field	of	politics.
First,	it	has	helped	cohere	and	then	shift	those	parts	of	the	working	class	most	enamoured	of	such	an	identification
into	the	camp	of	the	anti-immigrant	right:	that	is,	they	have	come	to	invest	politically	in	understanding	themselves	(i.e.
the	white	working	class)	as	the	main	victims	of	globalisation.	Second,	by	juxtaposing	the	category	white	working
class	to	immigrant,	such	a	narrative	not	only	privileged	one	stratum	of	Britain’s	working	class	over	the	other	on	the
grounds	of	citizenship,	it	also	erased	those	parts	of	the	working	class	who	were	black	and	brown	Britons.	And
through	this	sleight	of	hand,	the	lived	experiences	of	those	whose	economic	austerity	was	overlain	by	race	and
gender	discrimination	were	simply	elided	and	closed	off	from	public	scrutiny	and	debate.	Third,	and	related,	this	had
the	effect	of	further	dividing	the	multi-ethnic	working	class	on	racial	lines,	and	in	doing	so	submerged	those	other
explanations	for	working	class	pain	–	the	austerity	imposed	by	Labour	and	Conservative	elites	alike.	This	has
damaged	(but	not	ruled	out)	the	possibility	of	a	united	working	class	challenge	to	neoliberal	rule.
An	urgent	question	is	therefore	before	us:	can	a	multi-ethnic	class	politics	re-emerge	in	a	juncture	where	the	racist
right	are	in	the	ascendency	and	the	infrastructure	of	anti-racist	resistance	appears	hollowed	out	and	in	long-term
retreat?
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Brendan	McGeever	is	Lecturer	in	the	Sociology	of	Racialisation	and	Antisemitism	at	Birkbeck,	University	of	London.
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